A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employeesand a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example -is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its reputation by making offers to higher-quality candidates, despite the risk that the candidates might reject the offers and leave the firm empty-handed? Or is it better to play it safe and go for weaker candidates who are more likely to accept the offer? The question acquires an added level of complexity once we take into account the effect one hiring cycle has on the next: hiring better employees in the current cycle increases the firm's reputation, which in turn increases its attractiveness for higher-quality candidates in the next hiring cycle. These considerations introduce an interesting temporal dynamic aspect to the rich line of research on matching models for job markets, in which long-range planning and evolving reputational effects enter into the strategic decisions made by competing firms.
INTRODUCTION
Markets for employment have been the subject of several large bodies of research, including the long and celebrated line of work on bipartite matching of employers to job applicants [25] , sociological and economic approaches to the process of finding a job [12, 19, 24] , and many other frameworks. Recent work in theoretical computer science has modeled issues such as the competition among employers for applicants [15, 16] and hiring policies that take a firm's reputation into account [5] .
Despite this history of research, there remain a number of fundamental issues in job-market matching that have gone largely unmodeled. One of these, familiar to anyone who has dealt with job markets in academia or related professions, is the feedback loop over multiple hiring cycles between the job candidates that a firm (or academic department) pursues and the evolution of its overall reputation.
There is of course a very broad set of ingredients that go into the competition for job candidates over multiple hiring cycles. This makes it challenging to abstract the basic issues into a model for this type of multi-period competition. In the present paper we pare down this complexity to try formulating a model that captures, as cleanly as possible, what we view to be the basic sources of strategic tension in the process.
We develop a model based on two firms that compete for candidates over multiple periods, with a pool of candidates that has the same structure in each period; the outcome of the competition for a given candidate is determined probabilistically, based on the relative reputations of the two firms at the time they compete. This is a highly reduced and stylized model, but it produces a complex set of behaviors that we believe should be components of any of a range of richer extensions of the model as well. In particular, the process of job-market competition in our model exhibits the following fundamental trade-offs:
(i) Successfully recruiting higher-quality candidates can raise a firm's reputation, which in turn can make it more attractive to candidates in future hiring cycles.
(ii) On the other hand, competing for these higher-quality candidates comes with a greater risk of emerging from a given hiring cycle empty-handed.
(iii) The incentive to compete for top-ranked candidates can lead to underemployment of lower-ranked candidates, as they are at risk of receiving no offers while firms instead compete for their higher-ranked counterparts.
(iv) The trajectory of the process can be heavily influenced by a small number of "accidental" recruiting outcomes in the early stages, as reputations are first being established.
The trade-off between (i) and (ii) above arises from the equilibrium in the dynamic matching game played by the two firms with respect to the pool of available candidates. We find that in equilibrium, there is an initial period of competition, which can end when one firm decides it is so far behind the other that it is no longer worth competing for the top-ranked candidates. For certain natural ranges of parameters, there is in fact an interesting bifurcation -depending on the random outcomes of the initial stages, there is a positive probability one firm will "give up" on competing for the best candidates, but also a positive probability that the two firms will compete for the best candidates forever.
The issue in point (iii) is a question of efficiency: if a firm's utility is the total quality of all the candidates it hires, then our measure of social welfare -the sum of the firms' utilities -is simply the total quality of all candidates hired by either of them. We can then consider the natural performance guarantee question in this model: how does the social welfare under multi-period strategic behavior compare to the maximum social welfare attainable, where the maximum corresponds to a central authority that is able to impose a matching of candidates to firms? We obtain a tight bound of 2 1 + √ 1.5 ≈ 0.898 on the ratio of the social welfare under the canonical Nash equilibrium to the optimal social welfare in this model, as the number of periods goes to infinity. The exact numerical bound here will of course be a property of our modeling decisions, but the trade-off that leads to it seems inherent in the structure of the multiperiod competition. Moreover, studying this performance ratio 1 as a function of the number of periods, we find that for some settings of the parameters, the performance ratio is worse for instances with a "medium" number of periods, rather than those with very few (where long-range planning does not have enough force to favor competition over star candidates) or those with very many (where the weaker firm is likely to stop competing, leading to a higher level of overall employment). 1 We use the neutral term "performance ratio" rather than price of anarchy or price of stability because -as we will see -our game has a natural equilibrium, and we are interested in the relative performance of this natural equilibrium, rather than necessarily focusing on the best or worst equilibrium.
Finally, the issue in point (iv) -the "accidental" effects of early competition outcomes -turns out to be analyzable in our model via a concrete connection to Polya urn processes [22] . We show how the evolution of the two firms' reputations can be tracked through an analysis that is closely related to the evolving composition of a Polya urn; however, the analysis is made more complicated by the fact that the steps in the process are under the control of strategic agents who are calculating their actions inductively with respect to the expected outcomes in future periods.
This particular combination of phenomena (i)-(iv) appears to be new from an analytical perspective using formal models, despite its familiarity from everyday experience, and its connections with strands of more empirical and ethnographic work in economics [29] and sociology [7, 23] . We thus view the reduced-form model developed here as correspondingly shedding light on the interplay between the inherent strategic and probabilistic considerations as the process unfolds -including the emergence from the model of qualitative principles such as the transition between longrunning competition and a decision by one firm to "give up" and accept a lower rank. Moreover, the use of a model with two firms is consistent with the long-standing style of analysis in terms of duopolies for multi-period game-theoretic models (see e.g. [2, 3, 17, 21] ); two-firm competition is often the initial place where one looks for principles in establishing such models.
As a last point, we note that while our model is expressed in terms of job-market recruiting, there are many settings in which firms compete over multiple time periods, making decisions that have effects on their reputations and hence their relative performance in the future. As such, the type of probabilistic analysis we carry out here for the underlying dynamic multi-period process may be useful in thinking about the strategic management of evolving reputations more generally -thought still of course in the highly reduced form in which we have expressed it. For example, it would be interesting to see whether our framework can be adapted to settings where related issues have been explored, including the study of product compatibility [6] . The issue of whether a weaker firm decides to directly compete with a stronger one, or to avoid direct competition, is also implicit in studies of the branding and advertising decisions firms make -including whether to explicitly acknowledge a second-place status, such as the example (discussed in [20] ) of the Avis car rental company's "We Try Harder" campaign.
Formulating the model
We now describe the model and its underlying parameters in more detail. Again, we stress that our model is designed to produce the essential phenomena in this multi-period competition as cleanly as possible, and hence is built on two firms that compete in a repeating structure over multiple periods. At the same time, the model is set up in such a way that it can be directly generalized to include larger numbers of firms and more variability between different time periods. We discuss some possible extensions briefly in the conclusions section (Section 5).
We set up the model as a game with two players over k rounds. We can think of each player as representing an academic department that is able to try hiring one new faculty candidate in each of the next k hiring seasons. In each round t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the players are presented with a set of job candidates with fixed numerical qualities. Since we have only two firms in our model, we will assume that the firms' hiring will only involve considering the two strongest candidates; we therefore assume that there are only two candidates available. Normalizing the quality of the stronger candidate, we define the qualities of the two candidates to be 1 and q < 1 respectively.
We want to be able to talk separately about a department's utility -the total quality of all candidates it has hired -and its reputation -its ability to attract new candidates based on the quality of the people it has hired. A number of studies of academic rankings have emphasized that departments are judged in large part by their strongest members; intuitively, this is why a smaller department with several "star" members can easily rank higher than a much larger department, and ranking schemas often include measures that focus on this distinction.
Given this, a natural way to define reputation in our model is to say that the reputation of firm i in round t, denoted xi(t), is equal to the number of higher-quality candidates (i.e. those of quality 1 rather than q) that it has hired so far. This is distinct from the utility of firm i in round t, denoted ui(t), which is simply the sum of the qualities of all the candidates it has hired.
We assume that a firm is seeking to maximize its utility over the full k rounds; however, note that since this is a multi-period game, and reputation determines success in future rounds of hiring, a firm's equilibrium strategy will in fact involve actions that are effectively seeking to increase reputation even at the expense of short-term sacrifices to expected utility. This, indeed, is exactly the type of behavior we hope to see in a model of recruiting.
Building on this discussion, we therefore structure the game as follows.
• Each player i has a numerical reputation xi(t) and utility ui(t) in round t. We will focus mainly on the case in which the two players each start with reputation equal to 1, though in places we will consider variations on this initial condition.
• In each round t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, player i chooses one of the candidates j to try recruiting; this choice of j constitutes the player's strategy in round t.
• If player i is the only one to try recruiting j, then j accepts the offer. If both players compete for the same candidate j, then j accepts player i's offer with probability proportional to player i's reputation. This follows the Tullock contest function that is standard in economic theory for modeling competition [27, 28] , thus we have : player 1 hires j with probability x1(t) x1(t) + x2(t) and player 2 hires j with probability x2(t) x1(t) + x2(t)
. The player who loses this competition for candidate j hires no one in this round.
• Finally, each player receives a payoff in round t equal to the quality of the candidate hired in the round (if any). The player's utility is increased by the quality of the candidate it has hired; the player's reputation is increased by 1 if it has hired the stronger candidate in round t, and remains the same otherwise.
Thus the model captures the basic trade-off inherent in recruiting over multiple rounds -by competing for a stronger candidate, a player has the opportunity to increase its reputation by a larger amount, but it also risks hiring no one. The model is designed to arrive at this trade-off using very few underlying parameters; but we believe that the techniques developed for the analysis suggest approaches to more complex variants, and we discuss some of these in the conclusions section (Section 5).
The maximum possible social welfare is achieved if the two players hire the top two candidates respectively in each round, achieving a social welfare of k(1 + q). The key question we consider here is what social welfare can be achieved in equilibrium for this k-round game, and how it compares to the welfare of the social optimum. In effect, how much does the struggle for reputation leave candidates unemployed?
The subgame perfect equilibria in this multi-round game are determined by backward induction -essentially, in a given round t, a player evaluates the possible values its utility and reputation can take in round t + 1, after the (potentially probabilistic) outcome of its recruiting in round t. There are multiple equilibria, but there is a single natural class of canonical equilibria for the model, in which the higher-reputation player always goes after the stronger candidate, and -predicated on the equilibrium having this form in future rounds -the lower-reputation player makes an optimal decision to either compete for the stronger candidate or make an offer to the weaker candidate. (When the lower-reputation player is indifferent between these two options, we break the symmetry using the assumption that the lower player hires the weaker candidate.) The canonical equilibrium can be also viewed as the result of a best response order in which at every round the higher-reputation gets the advantage of making the first choice. Proving that this structure in fact produces an equilibrium is non-trivial; in part this is because reasoning about subgame perfect equilibria always involves some complexity due to the underlying tree of possibilities, but the present model adds to this complexity because the randomization involved in the outcome causes the possible trajectories of the game to "explore" most of this tree.
We study the behavior of this canonical equilibrium, and we define the performance ratio of an instance to be the ratio of total welfare between the canonical equilibrium and the social optimum.
Overview of Results
We first consider the performance ratio as a function of the number of rounds k. As an initial question, which choice of k yields the worst performance ratio? When q < 1 2 , the answer is simple: for k = 1, the players necessarily compete in the one round they have available, and this yields a performance ratio of 1/(1+q) -as small as possible. When q > 1 2 , however, the situation becomes more subtle. For k = 1, the players do not compete in the canonical equilibrium, and so the performance ratio for k = 1 is 1. At the other end of the spectrum, when q ≥ 1 2 , the two players will eventually stop competing with probability 1 and the performance ratio converges up to 1 when k becomes large. But in between, the performance ratio can be larger than at both extremes; in particular, when the quantity q 1 − q approaches an integer value k from below, we show that the performance ratio is maximized when the number of rounds takes this intermediate value k. These results show how the time scale over which the players take reputational effects into account can have a subtle (and in this case non-monotonic) effect on the efficiency of the job market. We then turn to the main result of the paper, which is to analyze the performance ratio in the limit as the number of rounds k goes to infinity. When q ≥ 1 2 , as just noted, we show that the two players will eventually stop competing with probability 1 and the performance ratio converges to 1. But when q < 1 2 , something more complex happens: there is a positive probability, strictly between 0 and 1, that the players compete forever. This has a natural interpretation -as reputations evolve, the two players can settle into relative levels of reputation under which it is worthwhile for the lower player to compete for the stronger candidate; but it may also happen that after a finite number of rounds, one player decides that it is too weak to continue competing for the stronger candidate, and it begins to act on its second-tier status. What is interesting is that each of these outcomes has a positive probability of occurring.
The possibility of indefinite competition leads to a nontrivial performance ratio; we show that the worst case occurs when q = √ 1.5 − 1 ≈ .2247, with a performance ratio of 2 1 + √ 1.5 ≈ 0.898. We also show that the performance ratio converges to 1 as q goes either to 0 or to 1. Our analysis proceeds by defining an urn process that tracks the evolution of the players' reputations; this is a natural connection to develop, since urn processes are based on models in which probabilities of outcomes in a given step -the result of draws from an urn -are affected by the realized outcomes of draws in earlier steps. We provide more background about urn processes in the next section. Informally speaking, the fact that a player might compete for a while and then permanently give up in favor of an alternative option is also reminiscent of strategies in the multi-armed bandit problem, where an agent may experiment with a risky option for a while before permanently giving up and using a safer option; later in the paper, we make this analogy more precise as well. To make use of these connections, we study a sequence of games that begins with players who are constrained to follow a set sequence of decisions for a long prefix of rounds, and we then successively relax this constraint until we end up with the original game in which players are allowed to make strategic decisions from the very beginning.
In the full version of the paper, we also consider variants of the model in which one changes the function used for the success probabilities in the competition between the two players for a candidate. Note that the way in which competition is handled is an implicit reflection of the way candidates form preferences over firms based on their reputations, and hence varying this aspect of the model allows us to explore different ways in which candidates can behave in this dimension. In particular, we consider a variation on the model in which -when the two players compete for a candidatethe lower-reputation player succeeds with a fixed probability p < 1 2 and the higher-reputation player succeeds with probability 1 − p. This model thus captures the long-range competition to become the higher-reputation player using an extremely simple model of competition within each round. The main result here is that for all p < q, the performance ratio converges to 1; the analysis makes use of biased random walks in place of urn processes to analyze the long-term competition between the players.
Further Related Work
As noted above, there has been recent theoretical work studying the effect of reputation and competition in job markets. Broder et al. consider hiring strategies designed to increase the average quality of a firm's employees [5] . Our focus here is different, due to the feedback effects from future rounds that our model of competition generates: a few weak initial hires can make it very difficult for a player to raise its quality later, while a few strong initial hires can make the process correspondingly much easier. Immorlica et al. consider competition between employers, though in a quite different model where candidates are presented one at a time as in the secretary problem [15, 16] , and each player's goal is to hire a candidate that is stronger than the competitor's. They do not incorporate the spillover of this competition into future rounds.
Our work can also be viewed as developing techniques for analyzing the performance ratio and/or price of anarchy in settings that involve dynamic matchings -when nodes on one side of a bipartite graph must make strategic decisions about matchings to nodes that arrive dynamically to the other side of the graph. In the context of job matching, Shimer and Smith consider a dynamic matching model of a labor market in which the central constraint is the cost of searching for potential partners [26] . Haeringer and Wooders apply dynamic matching to the problem of sequential job offers over time [13] , but in a setting that considers the sequencing of offers in a single hiring cycle; this leads to different questions, since the consequence for reputation in future hiring cycles is not in the scope of their investigation. Dynamic matchings have also been appearing in a number of other recent application contexts (e.g. [8, 30] ), and there are clearly many unresolved questions here about the cost of strategic behavior.
THE CANONICAL EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS PROPERTIES
An instance of the recruiting game, as described in the introduction, is defined by the initial reputations x1 and x2 of the two players; the relative quality q of the weaker candidate compared to the stronger one; and the number of rounds k. Accordingly, we denote an instance of the game by G k,q (x1, x2). Generally q will be clear from context, and so we will also refer to this game as simply G k (x1, x2). We will refer to the player of higher reputation as the higher player, and the player of lower reputation as the lower player. In case the players have the same reputation we will refer to player 1 as the higher player.
The game as defined is an extensive-form game, and as such it can admit many subgame perfect equilibria. For example, it is easy to construct a single-round game in which it is an equilibrium for the lower player to try to recruit the stronger candidate and for the higher player to go after the weaker candidate. This equilibrium clearly has a less natural structure than one in which the higher player goes after the stronger option; to avoid such pathologies, as noted in the introduction, we will study multi-round strategies s k (x1, x2) that are defined as follows: Denote by s k (x1, x2) the following strategies for the players over the k rounds: in every round the higher player goes for the stronger candidate and the lower player best-responds by choosing the candidate that maximizes its utility, taking into account the current round and all later rounds by induction.
For s k (x1, x2) to be well-defined we make the following two assumptions: (1) If the lower player is indifferent between going for the stronger candidate and the weaker candidate we assume it chooses to go for the weaker candidate. (2) If the two players have the same reputations we break ties in favor of player 1.
The strategies s k (x1, x2) can be summarized essentially by saying that in every round of the game, first the higher player gets to make an offer to its preferred candidate, and given this decision the lower player makes the choice maximizing its utility. To show that the strategies s k (x1, x2) form a subgame perfect equilibrium we will show inductively that in every round it is in the higher player's best interest to make an offer to the stronger candidate. More formally we denote the strategy of making an offer to the stronger candidate in some round by + and to the weaker candidate by −. We define f (s k (x1, x2)) to be the pair of strategies that the players use in the first round of s k (x1, x2).
We denote player i's utility when the two players play the strategies prescribed by s k (x1, x2) by ui(s k (x1, x2)). We now formally write down the utility of the players in s k (x1, x2) based on the value of f (s k (x1, x2)):
(1 + u2(s k−1 (x1, x2 + 1))).
•
We denote the social welfare of playing the strategies
Even though it is natural to suspect that the strategies s k (x1, x2) are indeed a sub-game perfect equilibrium, proving that this is the case is not such a simple task. The first step in showing that the strategies s k (x1, x2) are a subgame perfect equilibrium, and a useful fact by itself, is the monotonicity of the players' utilities ui(s k (x1, x2) ). More formally, in the full version of the paper we show that: Claim 2.2. For any x1, x2, and > 0: (s k (x1+ , x2) ).
Next, we prove that the three following statements hold. Proposition 2.3. For any integers x1, x2 and k the following holds for the strategies s k (x1, x2).
1. s k (x1, x2) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the game G k (x1, x2).
2. If a player does not compete in the first round of the game G k (x1, x2), then it does not compete in all subsequent rounds.
3. The utility of the higher player in the game G k (x1, x2) is at least as large as the utility of the lower player.
Essentially, we prove all three properties simultaneously by induction on the number of rounds of the game. Let us mention two more claims that will be useful later on (all proofs are available in the full version of the paper):
Claim 2.4. If ui(s k (x1, x2)) = kq, for some player i, then player i never competes in the game G k (x1, x2).
Claim 2.5. If player i competes in the first round of the game G k (x1, x2) and wins, then in the next round of the game it also makes an offer to the stronger candidate.
Connections to Urn Processes
Note that since each player's reputation is equal to the number of stronger candidates it has hired, the reputations are always integers (assuming they start from integer values). These integer values evolve while the players are competing; and once they stop competing, we know by statement (2) of Proposition 2.3 the exact outcome of the game since the players will behave exactly the same as in the game that this is its first round. This brings us to the close resemblance between our recruiting game and a Polya Urn process [22] .
First, let us define what the Polya Urn process is: Definition 2.6 (Polya Urn process). Consider an urn containing b blue balls and r red balls. The process is defined over discrete rounds. In each round a ball is sampled uniformly at random from the urn; hence the probability of drawing a blue ball is b b+r and the probability of drawing a red ball is r b+r . Then, the ball together with another ball of the same color are returned to the urn.
There is a clear resemblance between our recruiting game and the urn model. As long as the players compete, their reputations evolve in the same way as the number of blue and red balls in the urn, since the probabilistic rule for a candidate to select which firm to join is the same as the rule for choosing which color to add to the urn, and by assumption the reputation of the winning player is increased by the stronger candidate's quality, which is 1.
A striking fact about urn models is that the fraction of the blue (or red) balls converges in distribution as the number of rounds goes to infinity. More specifically, if initially the urn contains a single red ball and a single blue ball then the fraction of blue balls converges to a uniform distribution on [0, 1] as the number of rounds goes to infinity. More generally, the fraction of blue balls converges to the β distribution β(b, r). Understanding urn processes is useful for understanding our proofs; however we should stress that our model and its analysis have added complexity due to the fact that players stop competing at a point in time that is strategically determined.
Connections to Bandit Problems
It is interesting to note that as long as the lower player stays lower our equilibrium selection rule makes this effectively a one-player game. In a sense, the lower player's strategy in this phase resembles the optimal strategy in a mulit-armed bandit problem [11] , and more specifically in a one-armed bandit problem [4] . In a one-armed bandit a single player is repeatedly faced with two options (known as "arms" following the terminology of slot machines): the player can pull arm 1, which gives a reward sampled from some unknown distribution, or pull arm 2 which gives him a reward from a known distribution. Informally speaking, by pulling arm 1 the player gets both a reward and some information about the distribution from which the reward is drawn. The player's goal is to maximize its expected reward possibly under some discounting of future rounds. A celebrated result establishes that for some types of discounting (for example geometric) one can compute a number called the Gittins index for each arm (based on one's observations and the prior) and the strategy maximizing the player's expected reward is to pull the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round [11] . Since by definition the Gittins index of the fixed arm is fixed, this implies that once the Gittins index of the unknown arm drops below the one of the known arm, the player should only pull the known arm. This also means that the player stops collecting information on the distribution of the unknown arm and hence from this round onwards it always chooses the fixed arm.
There are analogies as well as differences between our game and the one-armed bandit problem. In our game, the lower player is also faced with a choice between a risky option (competing) and a safe option (going for the weaker candidate). On the other hand, an important difference between our model and the one-armed bandit problem is that our game is in fact a two-player game and at any point the lower-reputation player can become the higher-reputation one; this property contributes additional sources of complexity to the analysis of our game. Moreover, it is important to note that for many distributions and discount sequences (including the ones most similar to our game) a closed-form expression of the Gittins index is unknown.
ANALYZING THE GAME WITH A FIXED NUMBER OF ROUNDS
We begin by analyzing the game played over a fixed number of rounds k and study the dependence of the performance ratio on k. In the next section, we turn to the main result of the paper, which is to analyze the limit of the performance ratio as the number of rounds k goes to infinity.
Our first result is a simple but powerful bound of 2q 1+q on the performance ratio, which holds for all k. This is done by relating the performance ratio to players' decision whether to compete in the first round. The argument underlying this relationship is quite robust, in that it is essentially based only on the reasoning that the players can always decide to stop competing and go for the weaker candidate. This bound also implies that as q goes to 1 the performance ratio also goes to 1. . Proof. We begin with the simple observation that the expected social welfare equals the sum of the expected utilities of the two players in the beginning of the game. To get a lower bound on the performance ratio it is enough to compute an upper bound on the expected social welfare. This is done by observing that ui(s k (x1, x2)) ≥ kq, since a player can always secure a utility of kq by always making an offer to the weaker candidate. Hence, the following is a bound on the performance ratio:
Corollary 3.2. The performance ratio of any game G k,q (x1, x2) is at least 2/3.
The previous corollary holds for q > 1/2 since 2q 1 + q > 2/3 and for q ≤ 1/2 since the performance ratio is trivially lowerbounded by 1/(1 + q) ≥ 2/3. Next, we ask what is the length of a game for which the worst performance ratio is achieved. For q < 1/2, this is simply a single-round game. However, for q > 1/2 the answer is not so simple. We show that when . It is interesting that the players' strategies in the games achieving this maximum performance ratio have a very specific structure -the players compete just for the first round and then the player who lost goes for the weaker candidate for the rest of the game. . Proof. Observe that by Claim 3.4 below the players in the game G kq ,q (x, x) compete for the first round (since > 0) and then completely stop competing. Thus the expected social welfare of the canonical equilibrium is k + (k − 1)q and its performance ratio is:
It is not hard to see now that as approaches 0 the performance ratio approaches 2q 1 + q .
We now prove for the kq's discussed in the previous proposition the players indeed compete only for the first round and then stop competing. More formally we prove:
the players compete in the first round and then completely stop competing.
Proof. Player 2 (which is the lower player in the game) competes in the game G k,q (x, x) if:
After some rearranging we get that this implies that player 2 competes if:
. Thus, by Claim 3.5 below we have that for any x1, x2 the players in the game G k−1,q (x1, x2) do not compete. This implies that u2(s k−1 (x, x + 1)) = k − 1 and u2(s k−1 (x + 1, x)) = (k − 1)q. Thus, the players in the game G k,q (x, x) compete if k > (k + 1)q implying q 1−q < k as required.
Finally we prove:
then the players in the game G k,q (x1, x2) never compete.
Proof. Let x2 ≤ x1. Player 2 competes in the game
After some rearranging we get that player 2 competes if:
Observe that u2(s k−1 (x1, x2 + 1)) ≤ k − 1 as this is the maximum utility a player can get in a (k − 1)-round game. Also observe that u2(s k−1 (x1 + 1, x2)) ≥ (k − 1)q and that by assumption
≥ 2. Thus, we have that a necessary condition for player 2 to compete is that k > (k + 1)q. This implies that for q ≥ k k+1 player 2 does not compete in the first round of the game G k,q (x1, x2). By part (2) of Proposition 2.3 we have that if a player does not compete in the first round of the game it also does not compete in all subsequent rounds which completes the proof. A very similar proof works for the case that player 1 is the lower player.
ANALYZING THE LONG-GAME LIMIT
We now turn to the main question in the paper, which is the behavior of the performance ratio in the limit as the number of rounds goes to infinity.
Our main result here is that as k goes to infinity the performance ratio of the game G k (1, 1) goes to 1 + 2qr 1 + q , where
}. In particular for q < 1/2 this implies that as k goes to infinity the performance ratio goes to 1 + 2q
This function attains its minimum when q = √ 1.5 − 1 ≈ .2247 and at this point it has a value of
≈ 0.898. For q ≥ 1/2, on the other hand, this simply implies that as k goes to infinity the performance ratio of the game G k (1, 1) goes to 1. Defining r = min{q, 1 2 } helps us to present a single unified proof both for q < 1/2 and for q ≥ 1/2.
The proof of this theorem becomes somewhat involved even though its main idea is quite natural. Intuitively speaking, we know that as long as the players compete, our game proceeds the way an urn process does. This means that the probability that player 2, for example, is the one to hire the stronger candidate converges to a uniform distribution as the number of rounds k the players compete goes to infinity.
Henceforth, we will also refer to this probability as player's 2 relative reputation. We show that if the relative reputation of one of the players converges to a number smaller than r, then after a fairly small number of rounds -specifically θ(ln(k)) -the players stop competing. The probability that the relative reputation of one of the players converges to something less than r is simply 2r. Therefore, the expected social welfare of our canonical equilibrium converges to k + 2qr(k − θ(ln(k))) and the performance ratio converges to 1+2qr 1+q
. We divide the proof to four subsections. In Subsection 4.1 we introduce t-binding games, which give us a formal way to study games in which the two players compete for at least the first t rounds. By showing that the utilities of the players in our game are at least as large as their utilities in the tbinding game we reduce our problem to showing that the expected utility in a t-binding game is "large enough". This is done in Subsection 4.3. The proof relies on Subsection 4.2 which, loosely speaking, shows that if after t rounds of competition the relative reputation of the lower player is non-trivially smaller than r then the lower player stops competing. Finally, in Subsection 4.4 we state the formal theorem and wrap up the proof.
t-Binding Games
A recruiting game is t-binding if in the first t rounds the two players are required to compete for the stronger candidate. We denote a t-binding game by G t k (x1, x2). We also denote by s t k (x1, x2) the canonical equilibrium of the game G t k (x1, x2) in which the players compete for the first t rounds and then follow the strategies s k−t (x 1 , x 2 ) in the resulting game.
Denote by u(s t k (x1, x2)) the expected social welfare of the canonical equilibrium in the game G t k (x1, x2). It is intuitive to suspect that making the players compete for the first t rounds can only decrease their utility. In the next lemma we prove that this intuition is indeed correct:
Lemma 4.1. The expected social welfare of the game G k (1, 1) is greater than or equal to the expected social welfare of the game G t k (1, 1) ; that is, u(s k (1, 1)) ≥ u(s t k (1, 1) ). Proof. We prove the lemma by proving a stronger claim: Claim 4.2. The expected utility of each of the players in the game G t k (1, 1) for 0 ≤ t < k is greater than or equal to their expected utility in the game G t+1 k (1, 1) .
Proof. For simplicity we prove the claim for player 2; however the claim holds for both players. By definition, in the game G t k (1, 1) the players compete for at least the first t rounds. During this phase of competition, the two players' reputations evolve according to the update rule for a standard Polya urn process, as described in Section 2. A standard result on that process implies that at the end of these t rounds with probability 1 t+1 player 1 has a reputation of 1+t−i and player 2 has a reputation of 1+i for 0 ≤ i ≤ t. Thus, we have that:
Let I δ = {i|f (s k−t (1 + t − i, 1 + i)) = δ} for δ ∈ { +, + , +, − , −, + }. For example, I +,+ is the set of all indices i for which the players compete in the first round of the game G k−t (1 + t − i, 1 + i).
We can now write the sum, usefully, as
By this partition:
-since in both of these games the two players compete in the first round.
• For i ∈ I +,− , we have u2(
(in the first round of the game player 2 prefers going after the weaker candidate over competing).
• For i ∈ I −,+ , we have u2(
Thus, we have u2(s
When does the lower player stop competing?
This next phase of our analysis is composed of two parts: in the first part we show that the utility of the lower player in a k-round game is upper bounded by max{bq(k, t, x), kq} for some function bq(·) to be later defined. In the second part we compute the conditions under which bq(k, t, x) < kq which implies that under the same conditions the lower player in the game stops competing.
For this subsection we denote player 1's reputation after t rounds by t − x and player 2's reputation by x. Both statements below also hold for player 1 and the game G k (x, t−x).
The following notation will be useful for our proofs:
• fq(i, t) = t i q i (1 − q) t−i -probability mass function for the binomial distribution with t trials.
• Fq(x, t) =
The function that we use to upper bound the player's utility is:
To understand the intuition behind the upper bound function bq(k, t, x) it is useful to look at an alternative description of the urn process. Under this description, we have a coin whose bias is sampled from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]; then in each round the coin is tossed. If the coin turns up heads a blue ball is added to the urn; otherwise a red ball is added to the urn. Under this alternative description we can think of our lower player as trying to toss this coin (i.e. competing) in the hope that its bias is greater than r (recall that r = min{q, 1 2 }). We refer to the event in which the bias of the coin is greater than r as a good event, and the event it is not a bad event. To upper-bound the player's utility we assume that if the good event happens the player wins the stronger candidate for all subsequent rounds and hence its utility is k. If the bad event happens then the player completely stops competing and thus its utility is (k − 1)q.
We show that max{bq(k, t, x), kq} is indeed an upper bound on the players' utility as the previous intuition suggests. . Corollary 4.7. As k goes to infinity, the performance ratio of the game G k (1, 1, ) goes to 1+2rq 1+q .
Wrapping up the Proof

CONCLUSIONS
When firms compete for job applicants over many hiring cycles, there is a basic strategic tension inherent in the process: trying to recruit highly sought-after job candidates can build up a firm's reputation, but it comes with the risk that firm will fail to hire anyone at all. In this paper, we have shown how this tension can arise in a simple dynamic model of job-market matching. Although our model is highly stylized, it contains a number of interesting effects that we analyze, including the way in which competition can lead to inefficiency through underemployment (quantified in our analysis of the performance ratio at equilibrium) and the possibility of different modes of behavior, in which a weaker firm may end up competing forever, or it may give up at some point and accept its second-place status.
The model and analysis also suggest a number of directions for further investigation. One direction is to vary the competition function that determines the outcome of a competition between the two firms when they make offers to the same candidate. As noted above, this can be viewed as varying the way in which candidates make decisions between firms based on their reputations.In the full version of the paper, we explore this issue by considering an alternate rule for competition in which the lower-reputation player wins with a fixed probability p < 1 2 (independent of the difference in reputation) and the higher-reputation player wins with probability 1 − p.
This fixed-probability competition function is simpler in structure than the Tullock function, and it is illuminating in that it cleanly separates two different aspects of the strategic decision being made about future rounds. With the Tullock function, when the lower player competes, it has the potential for a short-term gain in its success probability even in the next round (since the ratio of reputations will change), and it also has the potential for a long-term gain by becoming the higher player. With the fixed-probability competition function, the short-term aspect is effectively eliminated, since as long as a player remains the lower party, it has the same probability of success; we are thus able to study strategic behavior about competing when the only upside is the longrange prospect of becoming the higher player. We show that the performance is generally much better with this fixedprobability rule than with the Tullock function, providing us with further insight into the specific way in which competition leads to inefficiency through a reduced performance ratio.
Other directions that lead quickly to interesting questions are to consider the case of more than two firms, and to consider models in which the candidates have different characteristics in different time periods. For both of these general directions, our initial investigations suggest that the techniques developed here will be useful for shedding light on the properties of more complex models that take these issues into account.
